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LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
PETER D. EHRENHAFT* 
I am standing, or sitting, between you and a reception, which is a very 
difficult place to be. However, I do want to share a few thoughts with you. 
First, I think that the term “legal ethics,” as it has been discussed here, 
is as much an oxymoron as “military justice.” I think that what we have 
been talking about has very little to do with ethics, and a lot to do with 
what we, at the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice understood 
was the relevant term: “Unauthorized Practice of Law” (UPL). 
Bear in mind that before this audience I am discussing practices on 
behalf of sophisticated clients who understand the implications of using 
lawyers. My remarks may not well extend to individuals who are 
unfamiliar with the needs for and limitations of legal advice. Also, I do not 
here focus on the control all courts and agencies may properly impose on 
the persons who appear before them. Our concentration here is on lawyers 
advising knowledgeable clients in transactions that cross borders—as 
more and more do daily. 
Moreover, when I speak of “ethics” I am referring to a layperson’s 
concept of moral propriety. These ideas do not necessarily coincide with 
what are loosely referred to as “legal ethics” and which are more properly 
labeled as “rules of professional conduct.” But the facts are that many of 
the “rules” are discussed and labeled as “ethical imperatives,” and it is that 
notion that I will address. 
When we are talking about “rules of professional conduct” or UPL, we 
refer to constraints on the practice of law regulators impose. The UPL 
rules are essentially guild rules, not ethics. What are their justifications? 
As far as ethics are concerned, I think there are only three ethical rules, 
and, indeed, I would say there is really only one that is the overriding 
principle, with which we all need to comply, and that is competence.  
Without legal competence, a lawyer’s advice is mere conversation. 
Competence requires a lawyer’s full understanding of the factual bases on 
which his advice will be provided, the legal principles applied to those 
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facts and an ability to articulate for the client how the facts and the law 
relate to one another. 
It is not possible to measure competence in advance; it is determined 
after the fact. Only after a car crash do we determine whether the driver 
was incompetent, intoxicated, or negligent. Success in passing an 
examination may show the driver once knew how to operate a vehicle and 
understood the road rules at the time, but five or fifty years later, vehicle 
designs and even road rules change. Yet, we drive a lifetime, in many 
regions, on the basis of that first test qualifying us for a license. 
This is an apt model for lawyers: graduation from law school and 
passage of a bar exam rest on and test knowledge at a particular time and 
often rely on memory, not the developed expertise of giving legal advice. 
The substance of law changes, and with increased specialization, the 
lawyer’s competence narrows. Therefore bar admission, based on historic 
examination provides slim evidence of present competence. It allows, and 
ought to be limited to, initial entry.  
The question of how we can protect clients and the public from 
incompetent lawyers in an international context can be compared with the 
way we deal with producers of defective goods. Injured consumers 
properly claim a right to act and the same rule can apply to legal advice. 
An injured party may seek recourse in the courts of his own country, 
obtain a judgment, and seek to collect compensation where possible. At 
the same time, regarding legal advice, that party may seek to limit or even 
revoke the offending lawyer’s “driver’s license.” Our institutions and 
practices may not be in place to deal with “bad drivers” from elsewhere. 
But this is a matter of modernizing procedures, facilitating reciprocal 
enforcement of sanctions. The concept is desirable, feasible, and fully 
ethical. The mere fact that enforcing a judgment in another country may be 
difficult does not justify a blanket prohibition on allowing foreigners 
access to the local market, just as the importation of one rotten apple does 
not support an embargo on trade in all fruit from the exporting country. 
This is not an issue of ethics, but a challenge to develop better rules for the 
enforcement of foreign judgments. 
The second ethical principle is “faithfulness.” Faithfulness to the client 
requires, first, adherence to a number of ordinary principles that are 
properly regarded as the ethics of moral man: Don’t lie; don’t steal; don’t 
cheat; don’t destroy evidence; don’t claim as fact what you don’t know to 
be fact. In the case of a lawyer it also requires avoiding even the 
appearance of conflicts of interest and applying appropriate diligence on 
the client’s behalf. As a prerequisite to providing full and effective 
representation, the ethics of the lawyer must protect the “attorney-client 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/7
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privilege”; fealty is undermined by requirements that a lawyer “tattle.” It 
should be left to others to shoulder the responsibility of finding 
wrongdoing. The conflict of interest rules are appropriate corollaries to 
this idea. Moreover, as partners owe featly to one another—as they 
should—they cannot violate that value for the sake of a client that is in 
conflict with a partner’s client. We try to squirm away from this logic. But 
ethical rules clearly say we cannot do so. We may, therefore, question 
whether “screens” to prevent lawyers in a single firm from seeing 
conflicting clients’ files are consistent with ethical principles or, instead, a 
practical accommodation to the requirements—demands—of larger and 
larger law firms in which such conflicts become more common. This 
ethical principle is more readily submerged in the rhetoric regarding the 
alleged need for preserving the lawyer’s monopoly on local legal services. 
The third ethical principle relating to legal practice mandates fair 
service charges. Lawyers’ bills are not often discussed as an ethical 
question. But fees affect access to justice and, therefore, have an ethical 
dimension. A lawyer should charge an appropriate fee, which must be 
discussed with the client in advance of any work done for which a fee is 
sought. And a lawyer may properly refuse work if he will not be paid 
(other than at times when accepting pro bono assignments—that may be 
ethically required of those with a monopoly license). What is “fair” is 
driven by abilities to pay, non-coerced consent on an individual basis, and 
not a fee based on a schedule created by a cartel of bar members. Happily, 
in the United States, minimum—or maximum—mandatory fees are 
unlawful. 
I would suggest those three are the only “ethical” rules. The rest relate 
to the “Unauthorized Practice of Law,” which is an effort by regulators 
and our guild to keep competition out of law practices. It has nothing to do 
with ethics.  
The sea change that occurred with regard to the unauthorized practice 
of law did not arise, in my view, at the time of the 1998 discussion of 
multi-disciplinary practice. Multi-disciplinary practice was a concept that 
accounting firms attempted to foist on the organized bar and which the 
legal profession properly resisted. This attempt has fallen on its face 
because the accounting firms do not apply the same ethical principles as 
lawyers, particularly the conflict of interest rules that are so critical to 
ethical legal practice.  
Another event in 1998 was a sea change: in the American profession’s 
view of the bases upon which cross-border legal practice—multi-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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jurisdictional practice—can be pursued. I am referring to the opinion of 
the Supreme Court of California in a case called Birbrower.1 This case 
involved New York lawyers representing a California client in an 
arbitration in California. These New York lawyers had the misfortune of 
losing the arbitration before rendering their bill. When they sent a bill for a 
million dollars, the client declined to pay. The law firm turned to the 
California courts to collect its fee. The client contended it need not pay 
because the New York lawyers’ work in California in the arbitration 
constituted the “Unauthorized Practice of Law.” Therefore, the client said, 
it had no legal obligation to pay. The Supreme Court of California 
affirmed the decision, declining the lawyers’ claims. This sent a chill 
through the American legal profession. The ABA quickly organized a 
Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice. The focus of the court’s 
decision, however, was on the trans-state border practice of law, or what 
New York lawyers could do in California; it had very little to do with 
international practice. But wisely, I believe, the International Section of 
the ABA determined it had a dog in this fight as well, and should be 
represented. Thus, I was belatedly added to the Commission to deal with 
the international practice of law issue in Birbrower.  
Normally, when I talk about this to other lawyers, I start my 
conversation, by addressing “my fellow outlaws.” Quite frankly, we are all 
violating these rules every day. In the United States, modest efforts are 
being made to try and overcome this, in part in response to the effort of the 
Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice. The ABA is trying to urge 
states to liberalize their UPL rules. In my view, however, these rules are 
not being liberalized in an effective way that comports with our ethical 
obligations. Rather, these efforts are constrained by significant nods to the 
investment we have made in bar regulators. Moreover, the state supreme 
court justices, who must generally adopt rules, also have an interest in 
maintaining their control over the profession. The institutional inertia 
against attempts to liberalize is enormous. I think it is going to take quite a 
while before it is changed.  
The last thing that I would say is that the direction in which the 
European Union is going is commendable; it is gradually adopting the 
driver’s license model for the practice of law within the European Union. 
The big problem for us, in the United States, is that this model is a closed 
system. It is not available to us because we are not nationals of the EU. 
We are not at all pleased with the idea that the liberalized direction of the 
 1. Birbrower v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 4th 119, 949 P.2d 1 (1998). 
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EU is closed to American lawyers. We were hopeful that the CCBE, 
which testified before our Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, 
would follow its suggestion that we follow the London example. In 
London, anybody can practice, and the English legal market has thrived 
enormously because it is so welcoming and so open. According to 
Jonathan Goldsmith of the CCBE, there are a few constraints in England, 
other than the traditional requirements of competence and conflict of 
interest avoidance, that apply to persons offering legal services outside of 
court appearances. Jonathan was very persuasive to me. But his 
suggestions were not accepted by our Commission. The United States does 
not have the unity of the European Union. I’m sorry that now, in his role at 
the CCBE, Jonathan has defended an EU rule that is inhospitable to 
Americans competing with English lawyers in the European market. 
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